

## «PRICE OF SILENCE» OF THE CIVILIZED WORLD TOWARDS

### AZERBAIJANI AGGRESSION

DOI: 10.52174/2579-2989\_2022.6-117

*The use of solar energy has not been opened up because the oil industry does not own the sun.*

**Ralph Nader**

**Keywords:** Nagorno-Karabakh (Artsakh), Armenia, Azerbaijan, Turkey, European Union, United Kingdom, United States, oil, gas

*In the context of the paper, the permissive and extremely tolerant attitude of the civilized world to the arrogant and wild actions and war crimes of Azerbaijan in the framework of the Artsakh-Azerbaijani war of 2020 and beyond was discussed.*

*Drawing parallels with the same civilized world's reverse attitude to the Russo-Ukrainian war of 2022 and the insane obsession with "punishing" Russia with sanctions reveals the use of double standards.*

*Studies have shown that the "silence" of the civilized world in relation to Azerbaijani aggression is based on "weighty" economic interests, starting from the aspirations to replace Russian energy resources with Azerbaijani ones, to the share participation in the Azerbaijani oil and gas infrastructures and obtaining the exclusive right to exploit the Nagorno Karabakh mines.*

Although at the current stage of human development, it is accepted that "equality", "humanity" and "peacefulness" are considered as absolute values, nevertheless, experience shows that complex geopolitical relationships are based on completely different, more "tangible" interests and realities.


When we try to draw parallels between the manifestations of the attitude of the civilized world towards the Azerbaijani aggression of 2020 and the Russian-Ukrainian war of 2022, it becomes obvious that the developed world views the above-mentioned conflicts through the prism of double standards.



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Against the backdrop of the "stubborn" silence of the civilized world regarding the noticeable aggression of Azerbaijani troops, atrocities, torture of Armenian soldiers and prisoners of war, shelling of peaceful settlements with prohibited weapons and other war crimes took place during the 44-day Azerbaijan-Artsakh war, the unnecessary obsession of the same "civilized" West with regard to the Russian-Ukrainian conflict and the unprecedented persistence to "strangle" Russia with sanctions, at least give rise to serious reflections.

Since the outbreak of the Russo-Ukrainian War, Russia has become the world leader in the number of sanctions imposed (with a current total of 13,072 as of 15 December 2022), ahead of Iran, Syria, North Korea, Belarus, Venezuela and Myanmar combined, against which the total number of sanctions reached to 11,466. From February 22 to December 15, 2022, the total number of sanctions against Russia amounted to as much as 10,377. Most of the sanctions imposed against Russia until February 22, 2022 (2,695 sanctions in total) are related to the Ukrainian events of 2014<sup>1</sup>.

For comparison, let's record that during the war unleashed by Azerbaijan on September 27, 2020, no country has imposed any sanctions on Azerbaijan for the atrocities and tortures committed by the Turkish-Azerbaijani armed forces and hired terrorists against Armenians.

Until then, however, specific sanctions were imposed on Azerbaijan. In 1992, the United States imposed economic sanctions on Azerbaijan in response to its military intervention in Nagorno-Karabakh<sup>2</sup>. The sanctions were lifted in 2001. The other case was in 2010, when the European Union imposed an arms embargo on Azerbaijan in response to its military intervention in

Nagorno-Karabakh. That is all in the conditions of the conflict that has been going on already for more than 30 years.

The "downpour" of sanctions was not observed either due to a number of war crimes committed by Azerbaijan within the framework of the war operations of September 2020, nor due to the large-scale military operations carried out by Azerbaijan against the sovereign territories of Armenia on September 13, 2022 and the atrocities specific to the Turks.

Nevertheless, all the facts were captured and recorded for the world community to see. The conflict was marked by reported acts of mistreatment, desecration, and vandalism.

Human Rights Watch has alleged that Azerbaijani forces mistreated Armenian soldiers who were captured in the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh. Evidence of this mistreatment, including videos, was circulated on social media<sup>3</sup>. Human Rights Watch closely examined and verified more than 20 of these videos, including through interviews with recently repatriated POWs and family members of servicemen who appear in the videos but have not yet returned. Human Rights Watch also reviewed medical documents<sup>4</sup>.

Turning a blind eye to how an outspoken authoritarian regime in Azerbaijan could not only run over the Armenian population of Nagorno-Karabakh, but also willfully threaten Armenia, has made many Armenians question the double standards of the Western world, especially in the light of the response to the war in Ukraine<sup>5</sup>.

The issue has been discussed by Vahagn Avedian within his paper, entitled "Corroding Western Democracy: The Disparity between Azerbaijan and Russia". Drawing comparisons between the behavior of the USA and the

<sup>1</sup> Russia Sanctions Dashboard / <https://www.castellum.ai/russia-sanctions-dashboard> (Current Data as of 15 December 2022).

<sup>2</sup> Tully A., Azerbaijan: Aliyev in Washington to Urge End to Sanctions, February 02, 2000 / <https://www.rferl.org/a/1093296.html>

<sup>3</sup> VOA News, Human Rights Watch Accuses Azerbaijan of Abusing Armenian POWs, December 02, 2020 / [https://www.voanews.com/a/south-central-asia\\_human-rights-watch-accuses-azerbaijan-abusing-armenian-pows/6199086.html](https://www.voanews.com/a/south-central-asia_human-rights-watch-accuses-azerbaijan-abusing-armenian-pows/6199086.html)

<sup>4</sup> Human Rights Watch, Azerbaijan: Armenian POWs Abused in Custody, March 19, 2021 / <https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/03/19/azerbaijan-armenian-pows-abused-custody>

<sup>5</sup> Avedian V., Corroding Western Democracy: The Disparity Between Azerbaijan and Russia, September 15, 2022 / <https://www.e-ir.info/2022/09/15/corroding-western-democracy-the-disparity-between-addressing-azerbaijan-vs-russia/>

EU during the 2020 Artsakh-Azerbaijani and 2022 Russian-Ukrainian wars and its aftermath, Vahagn Avedian characterizes it as “a striking example of disparity and perceived hypocrisy”<sup>6</sup>.

However, this does not mean at all that the above-mentioned cases did not receive the attention of the members of the European Parliament. The proposal of 16 parliamentarians regarding the imposition of sanctions for Azeri barbarism towards Armenian population and the concern about the application of double standards was reflected in the parliamentary question<sup>7</sup> number E-003285/2022<sup>8</sup> requiring a written answer (see Box 1).

Perhaps the most remarkable thing in the above-mentioned parliamentary question is that immediately after the description of the murder and body torture of an Armenian female soldier by the Azerbaijanis, the gas deal is pointed out, which, in fact, “ties” the “hands” of the European Union in applying sanctions against Azerbaijan. This is perhaps the painful evidence of the dominance of economic interest over humanitarian ideas.

The only addressable step taken in this direction was perhaps the decisions of the French Senate, which adopted a resolution calling on the French government to impose sanctions on Azerbaijan for its attacks against Armenia and aggression against Nagorno-Karabakh. The resolution also condemns Azerbaijan for its September 2022 attack on the sovereign territory of Armenia, calls on Baku to withdraw its troops from Armenia, and reaffirms the 2020 Senate resolution calling on the French government to recognize Nagorno-Karabakh, while demanding guarantees that the status of

the Lachin Corridor, which links the region with Armenia, will remain unchanged<sup>9</sup>. This fair demand, however, has an important drawback: it is advisory only and has no legal effect.

However, this did not prevent the same France to continue supplying Azerbaijan with weapons. According to the EU online database of arms exports, during 2013–2019 France supplied weapons and ammunition worth about 148 million EUR to Azerbaijan, and only 4150 EUR to Armenia. During the same period armaments supplied to Armenia from EU member states worth of 30.6 million EUR, while the EU exports to Azerbaijan were ten times more – at nearly 340 million EUR<sup>10</sup>.

Therefore, in our opinion, peace-loving and humanitarian “civilized” appeals have no value when they are accompanied by massive supplies of weapons to the aggressor country...

In this regard, the following question of Anke Wiards becomes very relevant: “How did this politically controversial country nevertheless become one of the EU’s most important energy suppliers? Are Azerbaijan’s oil and gas more important than European values?”<sup>11</sup> This is a serious thought provoking question...

After joining the European Council in 2001, Azerbaijan entered into multiple agreements and contracts for the supply of oil and natural gas, including the construction of a new pipeline to facilitate the transport of these resources to the EU.

Taking an advantage from the Russian-Ukrainian conflict and the sanctions policy against Russia, Azerbaijan has recently positioned itself as an important energy

<sup>6</sup> Avedian V., Corroding Western Democracy: The Disparity Between Azerbaijan and Russia, September 15, 2022 / <https://www.e-ir.info/2022/09/15/corroding-western-democracy-the-disparity-between-addressing-azerbaijan-vs-russia/>

<sup>7</sup> Parliamentary questions are questions addressed by Members of the European Parliament to other European Union Institutions and bodies. They are a direct form of parliamentary scrutiny of other EU institutions and bodies.

<sup>8</sup> Parliamentary question - E-003285/2022, EU sanctions against Azerbaijan following its aggression against Armenia, 4.10.2022 / [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-9-2022-003285\\_EN.html](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-9-2022-003285_EN.html)

<sup>9</sup> French Senate Calls For Sanctions Against Azerbaijan Over Attacks On Armenia, Karabakh, November 16, 2022, By RFE/RL’s Armenian Service and RFE/RL’s Azerbaijani Service / <https://www.rferl.org/a/azerbaijan-armenia-france-sanctions-karabakh/32133024.html>

<sup>10</sup> Nazaretyan H., Arms Supplies to Armenia and Azerbaijan, Feb 17, 2021 / [https://evnreport.com/spotlight-karabakh/arms-supplies-to-armenia-and-azerbaijan/?fbclid=IwAR2N9hmS-Y7cl8ncXDeLQsrcG19zIwFw55\\_Y7fvYvNF2H7ZvE29REfzKLAFl](https://evnreport.com/spotlight-karabakh/arms-supplies-to-armenia-and-azerbaijan/?fbclid=IwAR2N9hmS-Y7cl8ncXDeLQsrcG19zIwFw55_Y7fvYvNF2H7ZvE29REfzKLAFl)

<sup>11</sup> Wiards A. (2021). Azerbaijan and the EU. Are Azerbaijan’s Oil and Gas More Important than European Values? Grin Verlag, 2021, 23 p.

## Box 1

### Parliamentary question - E-003285/2022

(Question for written answer E-003285/2022 to the Council)

European Parliament

### **EU sanctions against Azerbaijan following its aggression against Armenia**

*On 13 September 2022, Azerbaijan, with the support of Turkey, renewed hostilities in the Nagorno-Karabakh enclave. To date, 135 Armenian soldiers have been killed, contrasting with 75 Azerbaijani losses.*

*What is more, with politicians and the media complicit in their silence, Azerbaijan has demonstrated unspeakable barbarism towards the Armenian population. Anush Apetyan, an Armenian (woman) soldier, was tortured to death by Azerbaijani soldiers. She was raped, her fingers and legs were cut off and her eyes were gouged out. All of this was filmed.*

*Last month, Commission President Ursula von der Leyen signed a memorandum of understanding with Ilham Aliyev, the President of Azerbaijan, with a view to gaining access to the country's natural gas reserves and making up for the reduction in the supply of Russian gas to Europe.*

*Since we are sanctioning Russia for its invasion of Ukraine, it would be inconceivable to apply a double standard faced with the Azerbaijani invasion.*

- 1. Does the Council condemn Azerbaijan for its invasion of Nagorno-Karabakh and for its barbaric actions?*
- 2. Will the Council decide to impose sanctions on Azerbaijan, and to stop accepting Azerbaijani gas, as was the case with Russia? If not, does the Council consider this aggression to be less significant than that for which it has rebuked Russia, and, if so, on what grounds?*

Last updated: 13 October 2022

partner for the EU. A clear evidence of this is the achievement of a relevant agreement between the EU and Azerbaijan. The Memorandum of Understanding on a Strategic Partnership in the Field of Energy was signed on July 18, 2022 between the EU and Azerbaijan, which includes a commitment to double the capacity of the Southern Gas

Corridor to deliver at least 20 billion cubic meters to the EU annually by 2027. Commission President Ursula von der Leyen qualified this event as “a new chapter in EU’s energy cooperation with Azerbaijan, a key partner in the efforts to move away from Russian fossil fuels.”<sup>12</sup>

Due to growing importance of Azerbaijan

<sup>12</sup> European Commission, EU and Azerbaijan Enhance Bilateral Relations, Including Energy Cooperation, 18 July 2022, Brussels / [https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP\\_22\\_4550](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_22_4550)

as a potential supplier and at the same time transit territory for natural resources from Central Asia to the European markets, “European Union calls Azerbaijan a reliable partner”<sup>13</sup>. Azerbaijan’s “reliability” is actually largely determined by the fact that the EU, striving to reduce its own dependence on Russian energy resources, is considering replacing them with Azerbaijani energy sources as a potential alternative.

As for the “reliability” of the partner, it is noteworthy that in 2017, Azerbaijan, an important producer of oil and gas, was delisted from the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) - an international platform that promotes good governance and transparency in resource-rich countries, due to ongoing noncompliance with EITI human rights standards<sup>14</sup>. Besides Azerbaijan, among the other countries that previously implemented the EITI standards but withdrew or were delisted appear Equatorial Guinea, Solomon Islands, United States and Yemen<sup>15</sup>.

European countries are among the main importers of oil and petroleum products from Azerbaijan during January-July 2022. The biggest volume of Azerbaijani oil was imported by Italy (6.679 million tons worth \$4.979 billion), among significant buyers were the Great Britain, Croatia, Czech Republic, Portugal, Spain<sup>16</sup>.

Nevertheless, despite regularly tightening sanctions and import bans during the period from February 24 to November 25, 2022, EU countries imported 42.5 million tons of gas (51 billion EUR or 54.7 billion USD) and 106.4 million tons of oil (66.4 billion EUR or 70 billion USD) from Russia<sup>17</sup>.

Although the highly touted deal between Baku and Brussels from the beginning was

meant to wean Europe off Russian gas, it seems that Azerbaijan is now importing Russian gas itself in order to meet its obligations to Europe<sup>18</sup>.

According to the new gas sale and purchase agreement the Russian state-owned company Gazprom had begun supplying gas to the State Oil Company of the Azerbaijan Republic (SOCAR) on November 15 and is obligated to supply up to a billion cubic meters through March 2023<sup>19</sup>.

Meanwhile, the increased gas exports from Russia to Azerbaijan seriously undermine the aim of the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), which is to reduce European dependence on Russian gas and there is no a cast-iron guarantee that the MoU does not indirectly encourage Russian gas exports, especially bearing in mind that Azerbaijan can meet only a small proportion of European gas demand.

This is another justification for the fact that vital and economic interests are always preferred over humanitarian and peaceful aspirations. And there is no difference whether we are dealing with a “prosperous, civilized” developed country or any “ordinary” state.

Naturally, in the atmosphere of total impunity, Azerbaijan’s ambitions and illegalities will be continuous.

The Lachin Corridor, the sole road connecting Nagorno-Karabakh with Armenia, has been blocked by several hundred Azerbaijani protesters, posing as “environment activists” or “eco-activists” since December 12, 2022, protesting about the issue of alleged illegal mining of natural resources in Nagorno-Karabakh. This halts the normal movement of people and goods in or out of the enclave, including food, fuel,

<sup>13</sup> Euronews: EU calls Azerbaijan reliable partner, July 18, 2022 / <https://report.az/en/energy/euronews-eu-calls-azerbaijan-reliable-partner/>

<sup>14</sup> Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2021/ Azerbaijan <https://freedomhouse.org/country/azerbaijan/freedom-world/2021>

<sup>15</sup> Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) / <https://eiti.org/countries>

<sup>16</sup> AzeMedia, Top 10 countries importing Azerbaijani oil, August 17, 2022 / <https://aze.media/top-10-countries-importing-azerbaijani-oil/>

<sup>17</sup> Calculated according to Russia Fossil Tracker Data / <https://www.russiafossiltracker.com/en>.

<sup>18</sup> O’Byrne D., Azerbaijan’s Russian gas deal raises uncomfortable questions for Europe, November 22, 2022 / <https://eurasianet.org/azerbaijans-russian-gas-deal-raises-uncomfortable-questions-for-europe>

<sup>19</sup> Interfax, Gazprom could supply up to 1 bcm of gas to Azerbaijan this winter, 18 November 2022 / <https://interfax.com/news-room/top-stories/85105/>

and medical supplies, resulting in shortages of the products in the enclave<sup>20</sup>.

The barbarians using phosphorus munitions over Nagorno Karabakh forests next to the civilian communities<sup>21</sup> have suddenly turned into serious advocates of environmental protection, whose "concern" about environmental problems has reached such proportions that they were "forced" to close the only road connecting Artsakh (Nagorno Karabakh) to Armenia and the outside world and to stop gas supply within the framework of "preventive measures", depriving around 120.000 people of the opportunity to take care of their vital needs.

According to the Anglo Asian Mining, on July 5, 2022, the government of Azerbaijan approved a decision by which three new mines with total area of 882 square kilometers were transferred to this company on the basis of a concession contract. One of the three mines is the Kashin copper and molybdenum mine in the Karabakh economic region. Anglo Asian Mining uses the Azerbaijani local name for Kashin – which is Demirli, and reports that as of January 2016, the mine contained 275,000 tons of copper and 3,200 tons of molybdenum<sup>22</sup>. The British company took these figures from the data published by Vallex Group's Karabakh subsidiary, "Base Metals", which operates the mine. As a basis, the 2016 release of the Azatutyun radio station on the operation of the Kashin mine is attached to the website, qualifying it as "an unsubstantiated report"<sup>23</sup>.

The British government supported a London-listed mining company (Anglo Asian Mining) that was set to secure access to mining in the disputed territory

of Nagorno-Karabakh and other adjacent districts. According to the openDemocracy reveal, The UK's ambassador to Azerbaijan exchanged information about gold deposits in Nagorno-Karabakh and the surrounding territories with Anglo Asian Mining at the very height of the conflict<sup>24</sup>.

Anglo Asian Mining has held contracts with the Azerbaijani government to exploit goldfields in the country for 20 years, but the company was unable to access its concessions in Nagorno-Karabakh until recently, as those territories had been under Armenian control since the first Nagorno-Karabakh war in the 1990s. Azerbaijan's offensive against Armenia in the autumn of 2020 has brought these concessions under Azerbaijani control – and therefore under potential future management of the mining company. The most terrible thing in all this is that the Anglo Asian Mining revealed its projects to the British embassy in Baku, including information concerning its production sharing agreement (PSA) with the Azerbaijani government at the beginning of September 2020. This means that the agreement between the mining company and the Azerbaijani government has been reached at least three weeks before heavy clashes broke out between Azerbaijan and Armenia in Nagorno-Karabakh, granting the company rights to exploit mineral-rich areas in western Azerbaijan, as well as deposits in Nagorno-Karabakh and other territories which were at that time still under Armenian control<sup>25</sup>.

As it turned out, that Anglo Asian Mining holds exclusive rights to explore and exploit also the Vejnaly goldfield, situated in Zangilan region, a district on the Iranian border that had been under Armenian control and

<sup>20</sup> Forbes, With The Lachin Corridor Blockage, Nagorno-Karabakh Close To A Humanitarian Catastrophe, by Dr. Ewelina U. Ochab, Dec 29, 2022 / <https://www.forbes.com/sites/ewelinaochab/2022/12/29/with-the-lachin-corridor-blockage-nagorno-karabakh-close-to-a-humanitarian-catastrophe/?sh=57a05f6c6c90>

<sup>21</sup> Human Rights Defender of the Republic of Armenia, Azerbaijan is using, as the current data confirms, Phosphorus munitions: The Human Rights Defender, 31.10.2020 / [https://www.ombuds.am/en\\_us/site/ViewNews/1355](https://www.ombuds.am/en_us/site/ViewNews/1355)

<sup>22</sup> Anglo Asian Mining PLC, On 5 July 2022, the Government of Azerbaijan Approved Amendments to Anglo Asian's Production Sharing Agreement and the Company Acquired Three New Contract Areas with a Combined Area of 882 Square Kilometers. / <https://www.angloasianmining.com/operations/new-concessions/>

<sup>23</sup> New Mining Complex Inaugurated In Karabakh, Jan 05, 2016 / <https://www.azatutyun.am/a/27468929.html>

<sup>24</sup> Dowsett J., Revealed: the UK's Business Links to Nagorno-Karabakh, 17 June 2021, openDemocracy / <https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/odr/revealed-the-uks-business-links-to-nagorno-karabakh/>

<sup>25</sup> Dowsett J., Revealed: the UK's Business Links to Nagorno-Karabakh, 17 June 2021, openDemocracy / <https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/odr/revealed-the-uks-business-links-to-nagorno-karabakh/>

previously operated by a Swiss-Armenian businessman until the territorial gains of Azerbaijani forces during the war of 2020<sup>26</sup>.

Great Britain's interests in Artsakh were evident years ago, judging by the geographical distribution of Artsakh's foreign trade. The analysis of foreign trade indicators even in 2017 showed that the role of the second largest trade partner of the Republic of Artsakh was unexpectedly represented by the United Kingdom, with which in 2016 foreign trade turnover reached 26.9 million dollar USA. It is noteworthy that goods of the same commodity group were exported to Great Britain, and from there they were imported to Artsakh, in particular - precious stones and metals<sup>27</sup>. Even the fact that the Republic of Artsakh is not recognized by the United Nations<sup>28</sup> did not prevent the realization of "precious" interests of the Great Britain.

According to the data of the National Statistical Service of the Republic of Artsakh, Great Britain was the 2nd largest trade partner of Artsakh after Armenia in 2016-2017, ensuring a foreign trade turnover of about 33 million US dollars every year<sup>29</sup>.

UK ties with Azerbaijan are founded in far 1992 on the involvement of British multinationals, such as British Petroleum (BP or bp), in the country's dominant oil and gas sector. BP has been present in Azerbaijan for 30 years and is the largest foreign investor in the country. Since the beginning of operations in 1995 up to 2022 the capital expenditures of BP accounted for more than 84 billion USD on the Azeri-Chirag-

Gunashli (ACG), Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC), Shah Deniz (SD), and South Caucasus Pipeline (SCP) projects<sup>30</sup>.

In the above-mentioned circumstances, the silence of the elite of the United Kingdom in relation to Azerbaijan's aggressive actions towards Armenians and considering the both sides in the realm of "equal sign" become more or less understandable, because strong British-Azerbaijani business ties form serious interests that cannot be ignored. In this case, the following observation of Tom Wills from the Business and Human Rights Resource Centre is quite appropriate: "The UK urgently needs a strategy that makes it clear that human rights come before the profits of British corporations"<sup>31</sup>.

In 1994 the "contract of the century" was signed between Azerbaijan and oil companies from Russia, the United States, Japan and the United Kingdom to exploit the oil of the Caspian Sea's Azeri-Chirag-Gunashali field, launching the competition for the regional energy resources and communications between the USA and Russia<sup>32</sup>.

The United States is the second largest investor in Azerbaijan. In 2020 over 90% or 12.8 billion USD of US investments in the Azerbaijani economy related (14 billion USD total) to the oil and gas industry<sup>33</sup>.

Although the Trump administration has been largely silent about the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict, US interests in the region are multi-layered and highly interconnected with Russia's interests, expressed at least in 3 dimensions: energy, geographic and

<sup>26</sup> The UK's Business links to Nagorno-Karabakh Mining, 5 July 2021, Mining See / <https://www.miningsee.eu/the-uks-business-links-to-nagorno-karabakh-mining/>

<sup>27</sup> Pakhlyan A., Opportunities for Expanding International Cooperation of the Artsakh Republic // "Issues and Prospects of the Artsakh Republic's International Recognition" 2nd international youth conference sourcebook, Yerevan, UYSSA, 2017, pp. 192-198 (in Russian).

<sup>28</sup> Pakhlyan A., Ananyan A., Economic Development Challenges in the Countries Unrecognized by the World Community: Historical-economic Comparisons // "Scientific Artsakh" journal 2(3), 2019, Yerevan, UYSSA publishing, pp 285-293 (in Armenian).

<sup>29</sup> National Statistical Service of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic, Statistical Yearbook of Artsakh Republic, 2020, p. 329/ <http://stat-nkr.am/en/component/content/article/1204-2020>

<sup>30</sup> BP in Azerbaijan: 30 Years Together / [https://www.bp.com/en\\_az/azerbaijan/home/who-we-are/bp-in-azerbaijan/bp-in-azerbaijan-30-years-together.html](https://www.bp.com/en_az/azerbaijan/home/who-we-are/bp-in-azerbaijan/bp-in-azerbaijan-30-years-together.html)

<sup>31</sup> The UK's Business Links to Nagorno-Karabakh Mining, 5 July, 2021, Mining See / <https://www.miningsee.eu/the-uks-business-links-to-nagorno-karabakh-mining/>

<sup>32</sup> An Overview of the USA and Russia's Interests Through the Prism of the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict, Caucasus Edition, Journal of Conflict Transformation, 1 Apr 2013 / <https://caucasusedition.net/an-overview-of-the-usa-and-russias-interests-through-the-prism-of-the-nagorno-karabakh-conflict/#:~:text=The%20interests%20of%20the%20USA%20and%20Russia%20link,or%20as%20tools%20for%20the%20two%20great%20powers.>

<sup>33</sup> Over 90% of US Investments in Azerbaijan Account for Oil and Gas Industry, 24 May 2020 / <https://en.azvision.az/news/124892/over-90-of-us-investments-in-azerbaijan-account-for-oil-and-gas-industry.html>

geopolitical-instrumental. Besides, Turkey's stern position over the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict definitely affects Washington's approaches to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

According to the Guardians, America's lack of interest in Nagorno-Karabakh was first flagged in August 2017 when the US appointed its new representative to the Minsk Group, Andrew Schofer, but did not grant him ambassador status – putting him at a lower rank than his French and Russian counterparts<sup>34</sup>.

Finally, it is necessary to realize that the USA will never help Armenia in the fight against Azerbaijan and Turkey, because the latter are the most important countries from the point of view of US interests. Turkey is the main US ally and NATO member country in the Middle East and one of the most important countries in the region. For the US and the West, Azerbaijan is of key importance as an alternative source and

transit route to reduce dependence on Russian energy resources, so the stability and strengthening of Azerbaijan is in the interests of the US. The dimensionalist policy of Baku and Ankara towards Iran, the primary target of which is the Atrpatan (Azerbaijan) region of Iran, which is in the immediate vicinity of Armenia, is openly supported by the USA, Israel, Great Britain and several other powers as a factor that weakens Iran.

In fact, it turns out that all the superpowers are involved in Azerbaijan's oil and gas transactions to one degree or another, which has formed an obviously biased approach towards Azerbaijan. It is obvious that in such a case, the economic interests of the superpowers are aligned with Azerbaijan. And it would be at least naive to hope that any of them would dare to take punitive action against a strategic partner motivated by "false" ideas called "humanity" or "peacefulness".

<sup>34</sup> Safi M., Borger J., US Silence on Armenia-Azerbaijan Conflict Reflects International Disengagement, the Guardian, 4 Oct 2020 / <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/oct/04/us-armenia-azerbaijan-nagorno-karabakh>

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**Աննա ՓԱԽԼՅԱՆ**

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ԱՇԽԱՐՀԱՍՏՆՅԱԿԱՆ ՔՐՈՆԻԿԱ

**ԱՂԻՐԵՋԱՆԱԿԱՆ ԱԳՐԵՍԻԱՅԻ ՀԱՆԴԵՊ ՔԱՂԱՔԱԿԻՐԹ ԱՇԽԱՐՀԻ «ԼՈՒՈՒԹՅԱՆ ԳԻՆԸ»**

Հոդվածում քննարկվել է 2020 թվականի արցախա-ադրբեջանական պատերազմի շրջանակում և դրան հաջորդած ժամանակահատվածում Ադրբեջանի սանձարձակ և վայրագ գործողությունների, ռազմական հանցագործությունների հանդեպ քաղաքակիրթ աշխարհի ամենաթող և չափազանց հանդուրժողական վերաբերմունքը:

Զուգահեռներ անցկացնելով 2022 թվականի ռուս-ուկրաինական պատերազմի նկատմամբ նույն քաղաքակիրթ աշխարհի ծայրահեղ հակադարձ վերաբերմունքի և Ռուսաստանին սանկցիաներով «պատժելու» խելահեղ մոլուցքի հետ՝ բացահայտվել է երկակի չափանիշների կիրառումը:

Ուսումնասիրությունները ցույց են տվել, որ Ադրբեջանի ագրեսիայի նկատմամբ քաղաքակիրթ աշխարհի «լռության» հիմքում «ծանրակշիռ» տնտեսական շահեր կան՝ սկսած ռուսական էներգետիկ ռեսուրսներն ադրբեջանականով փոխարինելու ձգտումներից մինչև ադրբեջանական նավթագազային ենթակառուցվածքներում փայամասնակցությունն ու Լեռնային Ղարաբաղի հանքավայրերի շահագործման բացառիկ իրավունքի ստացումը:

**Հիմնաբառեր.** *Լեռնային Ղարաբաղ (Արցախ), Հայաստան, Ադրբեջան, Թուրքիա, Եվրամիություն, Միացյալ Թագավորություն, ԱՄՆ, նավթ, գազ*

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ГЕОЭКОНОМИЧЕСКАЯ ХРОНИКА

**«ЦЕНА МОЛЧАНИЯ» ЦИВИЛИЗОВАННОГО МИРА ПО ОТНОШЕНИЮ К АЗЕРБАЙДЖАНСКОЙ АГРЕССИИ**

В контексте статьи обсуждалось снисходительное и крайне терпимое отношение цивилизованного мира к наглым и диким действиям и военным преступлениям Азербайджана в рамках Арцахско-азербайджанской войны 2020 года и в последующий период.

Проведение параллелей с категорически обратным отношением цивилизованного мира к российско-украинской войне 2022 года и безумной одержимостью «наказать» Россию санкциями свидетельствует о применении двойных стандартов.

Исследования показали, что «молчание» цивилизованного мира в отношении азербайджанской агрессии основано на «весомых» экономических интересах, начиная от стремления заменить российские энергоресурсы азербайджанскими, до долевого участия в азербайджанских нефтегазовых инфраструктурах и получение исключительного права на разработку шахт Нагорного Карабаха.

**Ключевые слова:** *Нагорный Карабах (Арцах), Армения, Азербайджан, Турция, Евросоюз, Великобритания, США, нефть, газ*